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Abstract 
We examine the effects of board composition and ownership on traditional measures of bank risk 
and proxies of bank tail and systemic risk. Both banks’ corporate governance shortcomings and 
systemic risk-taking have been recognized among the potential causes of the 2007 financial crisis. 
Yet, their interaction has received less attention so far. Based on a sample of 40 European banks 
over the period 2006-2010, we find that the boards ‘characteristics affect banks’ systemic risk, 
except for board independence and that this relation depends on capital regulations, banking 
systems’ ownership structures and bank activity restrictions. 
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1. Introduction  
                                                 
Corresponding author 
The role of corporate governance in banking has been highlighted by academics as well as by 
regulators and policy makers (see e.g. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010; 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010). Many academic studies 
emphasize how flaws in bank governance played a key role in the performance of banks during the 
crisis (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Since 
the 2007, an increasing number of proposals and initiatives have attempted to identify and mitigate 
these flaws revealed by the financial crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009) aiming to promote better corporate 
governance standards in banking, while recognizing the special nature of banks when compared to 
other firms. On the other hand, the financial crisis revealed the dramatic impact of excessive risk-
taking behaviour of banks on the global financial stability, especially in terms of underestimated 
consequences of unregulated systemic risk-taking. As the literature has widely investigated poor or 
weak corporate governance as well as the increasing systemic nature of the banking sector as major 
causes of the crisis, to the best of our knowledge there is still a limited understanding of the 
relationship between corporate governance characteristics and banks’ incentive to become more 
expose to systemic risk. As suggested by de Andres and Vallelado (2008), the aim of banking 
regulators to reduce the runs and their systemic consequences on the stability of the system might 
come into conflict with the main purpose of shareholders which is to improve the shareholders 
value by also increasing risk-taking. Taking on risks and tail and systemic risks, in particular, may 
enhance bank performance in the short run (i.e. by increasing the leverage), but it can cause 
significant damage to the institution and the whole system when such risks materialize (i.e. fire 
sales “effects”). During the global financial crisis, European banks exposed themselves to tail and 
systemic risks in various ways. Among others, the most recent literature has highlighted how 
European banks' exposures to tail risks in the form of shadow banking activities were later 
transformed into severe losses on the balance sheets (Acharya et al., 2013: Arteta et al., 2013). 
 An increase in systemic and tail risks by large banks could be supported by the implicit too-big-to 
fail guarantee and the reduced market discipline (Acharya et al.,2010). In fact, it could be difficult, 
both for outsiders and insiders, to distinguish between risk-taking activities that generate high 
returns and those that offer high returns as compensation for taking tail risk through complex and 
opaque activities (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). In this context, the presence of a strong and 
independent board of directors may be crucial for the control of tail and systemic risks exposures 
and could explain the cross-sectional differences across banks in terms of tail and systemic risks. In 
other words, to the extent that the board plays its own role, we would expect banks with strong 
boards to be perceived as less risky and then to performed better during the crisis, when the tail risk 
occurs. Among several corporate governance characteristics, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2006) in its consultative document "Enhancing Corporate Governance of Banking 
Industry”, places the board of directors as an essential part of the bank regulatory reforms. In 
addition, the Basel Committee emphasizes the role of the board of directors in the implementation 
of pillar II and, more generally, for whole risk management architecture (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2005, pp. 163–164). This role is important for banks more than for other 
firms, because of i) the director’s fiduciary responsibilities which are extended beyond shareholders 
to include a wider range of stakeholders, i.e. depositors and regulators (Macey and O’Hara, 2003); 
ii) the complexity of the banking business: the presence of opaque bank lending activities  reduces 
the ability of shareholders and debt holders to impose effective governance (Levine, 2004); iii) the 
limited competition, intense regulation and the higher informational asymmetries (de Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008). Because the board is a key mechanism to monitor managers’ behaviour and to 
advise them on strategy identification and implementation, the directors’ specific knowledge of the 
complexity of the banking business is crucial to perform these roles efficiently. Pathan (2009) 
defines a ‘strong board’ (i.e., small board and more independent directors) as a board that is more 
effective in monitoring bank managers and that reflects more the bank shareholders’ interests. He 
finds that banks with strong governance attributes may take more risk. Although some studies 
document a positive association between board size and bank risk behaviour during the financial 
crisis period (Fortin, 2010; Minton et al., 2010; Adams, 2012; Peni and Vahamaa, 2012), other 
authors argue that the risk of financial firms vary inversely with the strength of corporate 
governance (Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Wang and Hsu, 2013; Faleye and 
Krishnan, 2015).  Erkens et al. (2012) and Berger et al. (2014) find no support for the proposition 
that board size is related to bank performance, both in terms of profitability and risk during the 
crisis. Also the growing stream of literature supporting the importance of non-independent directors 
for corporate boards show mixed results (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Baranchuck and Dybvig, 
2009). The post-crisis literature does not provide much support that board independence is 
positively related to performance, in terms of risk and profitability (Cornett et al., 2010; Yeh et al., 
2011). Both Minton et al. (2010) and Fernandes and Fich (2016) find a not significant relationship 
between board independence and firm performance, while the empirical results of Aebi et al. 
(2012), Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Erkens et al. (2012) and Wang and Hsu (2013) show that the 
presence of independent directors in negatively related to the risk behavior of financial institutions. 
Since ownership structures may affect bank performance, both in terms of profitability and risk, a 
recent stream of research on bank risk-taking typically incorporates information on each bank’s 
ownership structure. Also referring to that topic, the pre and post-crisis literature shows mixed 
results without offering a conclusive view (Gropp and Kohler, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Ellul 
and Yerramilli, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2014). This heterogeneity of findings 
suggests that results may vary with the ownership structure under investigation (i.e. insider 
ownership, institutional ownership, bank ownership, ownership by lower management, ownership 
by chief officers and outside directors, etc.). In our research we choose to rely on the works by 
Laeven and Levine (2009) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). Laeven and Levine (2012) find that banks 
with concentrated ownership are riskier than banks with dispersed ownership. Moreover, they 
suggest that the bank ownership structure strongly affects the relation between bank risk and 
regulation: while stricter regulation decreases the risk of a bank with dispersed ownership, it 
increases the risk of a bank with a large controlling shareholder. Therefore, also in line with 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012), we estimate the ownership of controlling shareholders and control for the 
effect of bank regulation. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is one of the first studies to 
analyse the European banks ownership structure, by using a new dataset provided by Garcia-Kuhner 
et al. (2013). 
By using data on 40 large publicly traded European banks, we examine whether and how banks 
with strong boards and different ownership concentrations are associated with higher systemic and 
tail risks. Academics and regulators have developed different concepts and proposals in order to 
assess systemic risk. We choose the measures of risk developed by Acharya et al. (2010), defined as 
the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES). Together with the (quasi-) market Leverage ratio (LEV), 
the MES is the main determinant of the Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES). Next to the MES, we 
employ the Expected Shortfall (ES) and two traditional measures of risk: the Volatility (VOL), 
estimated as the annualized daily standard deviation of the stock returns, and the Z-score, that is the 
distance to default (the higher the Z-score, the lower the probability of default of the bank and thus 
the risk of a bank failure). Since the summer of 2007, the financial system has faced 
two severe systemic crises and European banks have been at the centre of both (Acharya and 
Steffen, 2012). To avoid a confusing effect of the latter crisis, defined as the sovereign crisis, which 
origins and implications are different from the the former, we decide to focus only on the period of 
financial turmoil from 2007 to 2010. Moreover, since the previous literature suggests that the bank 
performance during the crisis is related to the risk behaviour before the crisis, we decide to include 
in our analysis also the year 2006. We focus on three corporate governance dimensions related to 
the board composition and functioning: (1) the board size, (2) the board independence, and (3) the 
frequency of the board meeting per year, measured as of December 2006. We also analyse the 
ownership concentration by considering the largest shareholder’s percentage ownership of the cash 
flow rights attributable to a bank’s total equity. Given that the prior literature (see e.g. Black et al. 
2006; Cremers and Ferrell, 2010) suggests that the corporate governance structures change slowly, 
following Erkens et al. (2012), we use data for year 2006, prior to the onset of the crisis. Hence, we 
assume that the strength of governance mechanism incorporated in the year 2006 is reflected in 
bank risk-taking during the period 2006-2010. 
We find that banks with larger board size and lower number of board meetings per year experience 
more severe losses than other banks during the crisis, but also that they contribute strongly to the 
losses of the banking system as a whole, i.e. to the spread of a systemic crisis. On the other hand, 
the number of independent directors is relevant for our proxy of the probability of bank insolvency. 
Moreover, we find that differences in banking regulations and ownership across countries are 
generally correlated with systemic risk taking. In particular, banks headquartered in European 
countries with i) more restrictions on bank activities, ii) less restriction on capital and iii) more 
concentrated banking system took more systemic risk during the crisis. 
As it is common in studies of corporate governance, endogeneity could bias our results. We take a 
number of steps to control for it. First, in all our models we control for bank-specific characteristics 
that are likely to affect risk-taking decisions, such as size, leverage, gross loans, impaired loans, tier 
1 and liquid assets (besides year and country dummies). Moreover, our corporate governance 
proxies are taken at the year preceding our investigated period. To control for the possibility of 
omitted variable bias we exploit the insight from Altonji et al.(2005), as in Chalermchatvichien et 
al. (2014), and find that the endogeneity bias is more unlikely in our results. 
We contribute to the existing literature in several respects. First, the investigated period allows us to 
shed a light on the relationship between corporate governance and banks’ risk exposures during 
persistent years of financial distress. Second, with respect to previous and more recent studies on 
the topic, mainly focusing on the U.S. banks, we are the first who provide insights into European 
markets. Thirdly, as far as it could be ascertained, this is the first study to employ market-based 
systemic and tail risk measures referring to the board effectiveness in monitoring bank managers 
(i.e. board size, board independence, number of meetings) in a single research, including ownership 
concentration. This is notably relevant given that the turmoil has illustrated how excessive risk-
taking could lead to financial instability by contributing to an increase in the occurrence of banking 
crises. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyse the relevant literature 
on corporate governance and systemic risk to develop our testable hypotheses. In Section 3, we 
describe the estimation framework, our sample and the model variables. In Section 4, we present 
and discuss the empirical analysis and its results. In Section 5, we describe the robustness tests and 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature and empirical hypotheses 
2.1 Corporate governance and bank risk-taking during the financial crisis 
Previously, an extensive empirical literature has documented that banks with strong corporate 
governance mechanism are generally associated with better financial performance, higher firm 
valuation and higher stock returns (Caprio et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2009; de Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008; Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2003; Jirapron and Chintrakarn, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Macey and O'Hara, 2003; Mishra and Nielsen, 2000; Pacini et al., 2005; Sierra et al., 2006; 
Webb Cooper, 2009). Yet, the existing literature has only partially investigated the relationship 
between governance and bank risk-taking, since several studies analyse a specific type of risk and 
governance dimensions, usually focusing on the United States. More recently, empirical papers look 
at the above-mentioned relationship over periods of financial turmoil, by focusing on the board 
characteristics (i.e. size, board independence, CEO-chairman duality, financial expertise of 
directors), the risk management and culture (i.e. existence of board risk committee, presence of the 
CRO on board, the professional background of the CEO) and the ownership structure. Although 
their evidence is not conclusive, their results provide empirical evidences of the following:  larger 
and more diverse boards have sometimes been associated with more risk; the number of the 
independent directors does not affect risk-taking and, moreover, the results on board financial 
expertise are mixed; stronger risk management functions and culture are related to less risk; 
empirical results on the relationship between  performance-linked remuneration in the form of 
options and risk are mixed, even if this kind of compensation tend to be associated with more risk; 
several studies show a positive association between institutional or insider ownership and bank risk-
taking referring to the financial crisis, but the evidence is not conclusive  for other periods. 
Before moving on the analysis of the various studies, it is worth to notice that only few researches 
analyze the influence of governance on bank tail and systemic risks during the credit crisis. In 
particular, we refer to the works by Adams and Ragunathan (2013) and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). 
Moreover, we point out that none of these studies focuses on the relationship between the boards 
effectiveness in monitoring bank managers (i.e. board size, board independence, number of 
meetings) and ownership concentration, on one hand, and bank tail and systemic risk, on the other 
hand. 
For the purposes of our research, our literature review will focus on the analysis on the most recent 
and relevant studies, investigating the relationship between both board characteristics and 
ownership concentration, on one hand, and bank risk-taking, on the other hand, over the financial 
crisis period. 
Referring to the board size, the sample investigated by Adams (2012) compares US banks that were 
bailed out during the credit crisis with those that were not showing that financial institutions that 
received TARP support in either 2008 or beginning of 2009 had larger boards than those that did 
not.  By analyzing a sample of US publicly-traded banks with total assets greater than $ 1 billion, 
Minton et al. (2010) report similar findings, as larger boards are associated with increases in the 
likelihood of receiving TARP funds. The authors argue that their results on TARP support can be 
interpreted differently: on the one hand, receiving TARP money may reflect poor performance, but, 
on the other hand, TARP funds could also be viewed as a unique opportunity for banks to raise 
relatively cheap funds during the crisis. If riskier banks were the ones that were bailed out, this 
implies that financial institutions with larger boards took more risk. However, we specify that these 
results are not consistent with those reported by Minton et al. (2010) for their non-crisis period, as 
they find that bank board size is negatively related to risk-taking. Using a sample of large U.S. bank 
holding companies in the financial crisis period, Fortin et al. (2010) suggest that banks 
characterized by strong governance mechanisms may take more risk. These results are in line with 
those of Pathan (2009), who, by analysing a sample composed of 212 large US bank holding 
companies during the pre-crisis period (1997-2004), finds that a small bank board is associated with 
more bank risk, proxied by several risk measures (total risk, idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, 
assets return risk, Z-score) whereas a high number of independent directors seem to imply less risk 
exposure by banks. Peni and Vahamaa (2012) find a positive and significant relationship during the 
2008 financial crisis for large publicly traded US banks. In particular, they show that banks with 
stronger corporate governance (small boards and more independent directors) mechanisms have 
higher profitability, higher market valuations and less negative stock returns amidst the crisis.  
Several papers show a negative impact of the board size on bank risk. Akhigbe and Martin (2008) 
argue that corporate governance is inversely related to bank risk behavior. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) 
focus on banks in 31 countries and document that large banks with lower leverage ratios have less 
negative stock returns during the crisis, but also that banks with strong boards perform worse over 
the period from July 2007 to December 2008 than other banks.  Wang and Hsu (2013) investigate 
the relationship between board composition and operational risk events of 68 U.S. financial 
institutions in the period from 1996 to 2010. Their findings suggest that board size is negatively and 
non-linearly associated with the possibility of operational risk events. Faleye and Krishnan (2015) 
employ three measures of bank risk-taking in lending decisions, namely the borrower’s long-term 
S&P credit rating, the inclusion of financial covenants in loan contracts and the bank’s decision to 
diversify its lending risk through syndication. Their sample includes 340 bank-years for 80 banks 
over 1994–2008. They find that banks with smaller boards provide fewer junk loans and are less 
likely to underwrite speculative loans. The inclusion of financial covenants is not related to board 
size. 
Unlike the results of the previous studies, both Erkens et al. (2012) and Berger et al.(2014) find no 
support for the proposition that board size is related to bank performance, in terms of profitability 
and risk during the crisis. In particular, by investigating a dataset composed of 296 large financial 
firms, including non-banks, across 30 countries during the 2007-2008 turmoil, Erkens et al. show 
that the relationship between the board size (i.e. number of directors) and their measure of bank risk 
behavior, proxied by the expected default frequency and the standard deviation of weekly banks’ 
stock returns, is not significant. Likewise, Berger et al.(2014) argue that management structures of 
US commercial banks, including board size, are not decisive for banks’ stability (i.e., propensity to 
default) during the recent financial crisis. In particular, by focusing on a sample composed of 85 
default and 256 no default US commercial banks, they show that the board size is not related to the 
probability of default of the financial intermediaries. 
As we have mentioned before, the post-crisis literature does not provide much support that board 
independence is positively related to performance. Both Minton et al. (2010) and Fernandes and 
Fich (2016) find a not significant relationship between board independence and firm performance, 
while the empirical results of Aebi et al. (2012), Erkens et al. (2012) and Wang and Hsu (2013) 
show that the presence of independent directors is negatively related to their banks’ performance 
measures. Consistently with the evidence provided by Beltratti and Stulz (2012), who find a 
negative correlation between board independence and risk-taking, also Erkens et al. (2012) show 
that firms with more independent boards experience worse stock returns during the crisis, by 
arguing that this is not caused by higher risk-taking, as board independence is not related to the 
expected default frequency and stock return volatility. One exception is the study of Cornett et al. 
(2010), that explores the relation between several corporate governance mechanisms and bank 
performance, by analyzing a sample composed of all US publicly-traded bank holding companies, 
that operate at any time during the 2003 through 2008 period. The authors find that a more 
independent board is positively related to banks’ performance during the crisis period, while the 
governance variable is not significant before the credit crisis. As highlighted by the empirical 
findings of Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Erkens et al. (2012), the post-crisis research show some 
evidence that board independence is negatively related to risk-taking. Similar results are reported by 
Minton et al. (2010). Likewise, Faleye and Krishnan (2015) find that board independence reduces 
the bank’s riskiness measured as the borrower’s long-term S&P credit rating and the inclusion of 
financial covenants in loan contracts, but it is not related to the bank’s decision to diversify its 
lending risk through syndication. Finally, Yeh et al. (2011) investigate if the performance during the 
recent financial crisis is better for financial institutions with more independent directors who sit on 
board committees. By analyzing data on financial institutions from the G8 countries, their results 
suggest that independence in auditing and risk committees is positively related to the crisis 
performance. This effect is particularly significant for civil law countries, which are characterized 
by poor shareholder protection practices. In addition, these authors find that the positive 
relationship between committee independence and banks’ performance is more relevant for those 
financial institutions having more excessive risk-taking behaviors. 
Since ownership structures may affect bank performance, both in terms of profitability and risk, 
many post-crisis studies focus on the analysis of this relationship. As outlined by the IMF (2014), in 
general, institutional ownership is related to less risk-taking, while insider ownership is associated 
with more risk. However, the IMF study (2014) states that the presence of institutional investors 
and of large insider ownership correlates with more risk in 2008. The underlying idea is that banks 
with higher percentage of insider or institutional investors hold a higher fraction of the ownership of 
the company and reduce their risk exposure, since they have a lot to lose. On the other hand, when 
the firm is close to default (as many did in 2008), managers take on more risk, as they have less to 
lose. Referring to that topic, the post-crisis studies show conflicting results. By analysing an 
international sample of banks, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that ownership by large shareholder is 
not associated with better performance during the 2007 crisis; however, their evidence shows a 
positive relationship between manager ownership and the stock performance referring to the same 
period. The results of Berger et al. (2014) suggest that defaults are strongly influenced by a bank’s 
ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower-level management, such as vice presidents, 
increase default risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of outside directors and chief officers 
(managers with a “chief officer” position, such as the CEO, CFO, etc.) do not have a direct impact 
on the probability of failure.  By analyzing a sample including 1.100 banks from 25 OECD 
countries over the period 2000-2008, Gropp and Kohler (2010) report that savings banks suffered 
larger losses during the crisis than cooperative or mutual banks. Moreover, they find that aligning 
the interests of managers and shareholders increases banks’ risk-taking, measured by the deviation 
of long term average ROE. 
In contrast to these findings, Ellul and Yerramilli (2012) show that banks with higher institutional 
ownership take less risk as measured by their Risk Management Index (RMI). However, in the 
presence of deposit insurance, they document the effect reverses and a positive correlation between 
tail risk and institutional ownership. Erkens et al. (2012) report that financial institutions with more 
independent boards and higher institutional ownership experience worse stock returns during the 
crisis period. 
 
2.2 Testable Hypotheses 
Based on the prior literature, we focus on the relationship between risk-taking and the following 
characteristics of the board of directors: the board size, the percentage of independent directors and 
the frequency of board meetings per year. The board of directors is an economic institution that, in 
theory, helps to solve the agency problems inherent in managing an organization (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). Hence, the role of the board of directors in the banking industry is to monitor and 
advise managers. Larger boards of directors could better supervise managers and bring more human 
capital to advise them. However, boards with too many members may suffer from problems of 
coordination, control, and flexibility in the decision-making process. Large boards also give 
excessive control to the CEO, harming efficiency (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; 
Fernández et al., 1997). Therefore, the trade-off between advantages (monitoring and advising) and 
disadvantages (coordination, control and decision-making problems) has to be taken into account. 
Given the time horizon we investigate, which is characterized by financial instability, we expect 
coordination and control functions to gain considerable importance compared to monitoring and 
advising and thus that small boards are associated with less risk-taking. In particular, we expect this 
idea to be confirmed by our measures of tail and systemic risks, which refer to extreme conditions 
of the individual banks and of the market, respectively, whereas the flexibility in decision-making is 
even more valuable. To summarize, the formal specification of our first hypothesis is the following:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Tail and systemic bank risk-taking are positively related to board size. 
As we have previously argued, the post-crisis corporate governance literature offers no conclusive 
evidence on the effect of independent directors on bank risk-taking. Moreover, also the extensive 
pre-crisis literature on the topic provide mixed results. Independent directors are believed to be 
better monitors of managers as independent directors value maintaining reputation in directorship 
market but the ﬁndings in this instance are mixed (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Bhagat and Black, 
2002). According to Pathan (2009), when the monitoring function is prevalent, we expect a positive 
link between the presence of independent and bank risk-taking. Moreover, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003) point out that the board independence is not important on a day to day basis and propose that 
board independence should only matter for certain board actions, ‘particularly those that occur 
infrequently or only in a crisis situation’ (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003, p. 17). However, an 
excessive proportion of outside directors could damage the advisory role of boards, since it might 
prevent bank executives from joining the board. Inside directors are able to provide the board with 
valuable information that outside directors would find difficult to gather. In other words, insider 
directors facilitate the transfer of information between board directors and managers (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Coles et al., 2008). We assume that a board with more 
inside directors is perceived as abler to support the managers in the difficult decision-making 
process needed in extreme market conditions. Thus, the formal specification of our second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Tail and systemic bank risk-taking are negatively related to the number of 
independent directors. 
We investigate the effect of the frequency of board meeting per year, as a proxy of the better 
functioning of the board (Vafeas, 1999). It is worth to notice that while in the pre-crisis literature 
several researches deal with this corporate governance dimension, there are no empirical studies 
analyzing the relationship between the number of the board meetings and the banks’ risk during the 
financial crisis period. As mentioned by de Andres and Vallelado (2008), meetings provide board 
members with the chance to come together, to discuss and exchange ideas on how they wish to 
monitor managers and bank strategy. Hence, the more frequent the meetings, the closer the control 
over managers and the more relevant the advisory role of the board. Furthermore, the complexity of 
the banking business and the importance of information (as for the insider directors) both increase 
the relevance of the board advisory role. By contrast, frequent meetings might also be a result of the 
board reactions to poor performance. Once again, given our focus on the effect of corporate 
governance on extreme market conditions, we expect that a higher number of meetings to be 
perceived as a proxy of a more timely response of the board to the external conditions and thus to 
be associated with a lower level of tail and systemic risks. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Tail and systemic bank risk-taking are negatively related to the number of 
meetings of the board of directors. 
Finally, we turn to analyse the ownership structure effect on bank risk-taking. The empirical 
evidence of our literature review show conflicting results. Moreover, also referring to this corporate 
governance dimension, the extensive pre-crisis literature provide mixed results. Laeven and Levine 
(2009) find that more powerful owners with substantial cash flows have the power and incentives to 
induce bank’s managers to increase risk-taking, in line with the agency theory. The idea is that 
when a bank has a concentrated share ownership, the tendency of managers (with bank-specific 
human capital and private benefits of control) to engage in less risky activities may be capped by 
shareholders (the resulting prediction is a positive relation between ownership concentration and 
bank risk). Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that greater shareholder influence through board of 
directors was not associated with better performance in the period after the 2007 crisis. Contrary to 
the agency theory, Li and Song (2010) find a negative relation between concentrated ownership and 
bank insolvency risk. This evidence is consistent with Burkart et al. (1997), who suggest that the 
monitoring effect exerted by the large shareholders deprives the managers of their private benefits, 
thereby reducing managerial initiatives.  
By assuming that more powerful owners of large banks can exploit greater bargaining power with 
regulators and governments in the event of a financial distress, we would expect concentrated 
ownership to be associated with higher systemic and tail risks than banks with dispersed ownership. 
However, large shareholders can also impose a better monitoring on managers and, more in general, 
obtain a better insight into the complex and opaque activities, which lead to bear tail and systemic 
risk. Thus, the formal specification of our fourth hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Tail and systemic bank risk-taking are negatively related to ownership 
concentration. 
2.3 Systemic risk measures 
The literature on systemic risk is recent and can be broadly separate into those taking a structural 
approach, using contingent claims analysis of the financial institutions’ assets (Lehar, 2005; Gray et 
al, 2009; Gray and Jobst, 2009), and those taking a reduced-form approach based on the statistical 
tail behaviour of institutions’ asset returns. In particular, referring to the latter strand of the 
literature, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) claim that a systemic risk measure should identify the risk to 
the system posed by “individually systemic” institutions, which are so interconnected and large that 
they can cause negative risk spillover effects on others, as well as by institutions that are “systemic 
as part of a herd”. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) refers to the financial sector's Value at Risk 
(VaR) of a bank as a given VaR loss (CoVaR) by using quantile regressions on asset returns 
computed by using data on market equity and book value of the debt. Hartmann et al. (2005) use 
multivariate extreme value theory to estimate the systemic risk in the US and European banking 
systems. Similarly, De Jonghe (2010) presents estimates of tail betas as a systemic risk measure for 
a sample of European financial firms. Goodhart and Segoviano (2009) look at how individual firms 
contribute to the potential distress of the system by using the CDSs of these firms within a 
multivariate copula setting.  
Our research will focus on the systemic risk measure referred to as Marginal Expected Shortfall, 
proposed by (Acharya et al. 2010). In comparison with other measures of firm-level risk, the MES 
is the only systemic risk measure based on market data, specifically accounting for extreme events 
in the left tail. MES has shown a higher predictive power in detecting a bank’s contribution to a 
crisis (Acharya et al. 2010). MES can be defined as the expected equity loss per dollar invested in a 
particular bank if the overall market declines by a certain amount and it is computed as the average 
return of each bank during the 5% worst days of the market. We first note that MES has been 
originally proposed by Tasche (2000) and later used by Yamai and Yoshida (2002). One example of 
this approach is provided in Engle and Brownlees (2010). They show that the banks with the 
highest MES are the banks that contribute the most to the market decline. Therefore, those banks 
are the most notable candidates to be systemically risky. Equity holders in a bank that is 
systemically risky will suffer major losses during a financial crisis and, consequently, will reduce 
positions if a crisis becomes more likely. MES measures this effect and it clearly relies on investors 
recognizing which bank will do badly in a crisis.  
3. Sample, variables and econometric models 
In this section, first we describe our sample and the selection strategy we adopt in order to build up 
it, then we describe and analyse the variables (dependent variables, key independent variables and 
control variables) of the models we implement. Finally, we focus on the explanation of the 
estimation framework. 
3.1 Sample and selection strategy 
Our initial sample consists of the largest publicly listed active commercial banks, bank holdings and 
holding companies headquartered in the European Union over the period 2006-2010. This time 
period includes the financial crisis but allows us to avoid data inconsistency related to the 
introduction to Basle II in 2005 and the broke out of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. 
The empirical analysis requires data on the banks corporate governance structures, banks and 
holdings financial information and stock prices, regulatory and macroeconomic information at 
country-level. In detail, information on bank board structures are hand-collected from the annual 
reports, the financial information and the data on stock prices and market capitalizations of banks 
are mostly obtained from Bankscope and from Bloomberg database, respectively. Regulatory and 
macroeconomic variables are from Caprio et al. (2007) using data in 2007 database (revised in June 
2008) downloaded from the World Bank database. 
After eliminating the banks with limited market price, financial and/or board-level information, we 
obtain a sample comprising 40 individual banks and holdings companies and 200 firm-year 
observations for the fiscal years 2006–2010. In particular, we adopt the following criteria to build 
up our sample. First, we restrict our sample to commercial banks, bank holdings and holding 
companies that were publicly traded for the overall analysed period (i.e. 2006-2010) in the 
European Union. This results in 123 financial firms. Then, we consider only firms with a market 
capitalization at the end of 2006 greater than EUR 1 million. This because large financial 
institutions were at the centre of public attention during the financial crisis and, more importantly, 
the size in terms of total assets is identified as one of the main factors to assess the systemic 
relevance of a financial institution. This additional limitation reduces our sample to 52 units. Third, 
we lose 12 firms because they lack of corporate governance information at the end of 2006 (prior to 
the onset of the crisis).  
Data on the ownership concentration of European banks is not readily available in Bankscope, 
where only current ownership information is reported, but it is not provided on an historical basis. 
Moreover, the computation of the ultimate shareholders implies the use of other databases because a 
large portion of European banks is owned by non-financial companies. Garcia-Kuhner et al. (2013) 
build a database on ownership of European banks. They use the entire universe of Bankscope 
(DVDs) and Amadeus Top 250,000 to track the ultimate shareholders of European banks. Before 
tracing back the ultimate shareholders of each bank, they cleaned the database from all those entries 
where the shareholders are recorded with a generic name (“Institutions”, “Management”, “Private 
shareholders”) for which they cannot identify a specific individual/ company as a shareholder1. 
When they find that a bank is owned by another company (either financial or non-financial), they 
identify the owners of that company and so on until they cannot trace back any further. Contrarily to 
                                                 
1
 This is the case for one of the banks in our dataset, i.e. National Bank of Greece SA. The only entry available for this 
bank is recorded as "Autocontrole", a generic name. Nonetheless, for this bank, they retrieved from an old file the 
generic name of the shareholder and the corresponding ownership and have included it in the file they sent to us. 
Laeven and Levine (2009) they do not impose any threshold (they impose a threshold of 10% in 
each link along the ultimate control chain). So they retrieve the ultimate shareholders of each bank 
at any level of ownership. Once they have identified all ultimate shareholders, for each of them they 
compute the cash flow rights and voting rights. Following Laeven and Levine (2009) we include the 
data on cash flow rights in our analysis. Despite the small number of individual banks, the amount 
of total assets of our sample totalled about 15,565,731 million at the end of 2006, this because it 
covers a substantial proportion of the total amount of banking assets in the European Union by 
construction. 
3.2 Variables 
Key independent variables: board variables and ownership 
Our key independent variables are the governance variables relating to the definition of strong 
board and ownership. Following Pathan (2009), the effectiveness of the board of directors in 
monitoring and advising managers determines its power and we use the term "strong board" to 
indicate a board more representing firm shareholder interest. Thus, a strong bank board is expected 
to better monitor bank managers for shareholders. Our proxies of strong boards are a small board 
size, a high percentage of independent directors in the board and a high frequency of board 
meetings. In detail, we define board size (BS) as the number of directors on the board. Independent 
directors (IND) is measured as the percentage of independent directors in the board. An 
independent director has only business relationship with the bank and his or her directorship, i.e. an 
independent director is not an existing or former employee of the banks or its immediate family 
members and does not have any significant business ties with the bank. The frequency of the board 
meetings (BM) is measured as the median of the number of the meetings held the in the years 2004, 
2005, 2006 (before the crisis). This variable takes into account the internal functioning of the board 
(de Andres and Vallelado, 2008) and how the board operates. Since meetings provide board 
members with the chance to come together and discuss on how they wish to monitor managers, we 
can argue that more frequent meetings imply closer control over managers. 
As to our proxy of ownership concentration (CFR), following Leavin and Levine (2009), we 
construct a dummy variable that assumes a value equal to 0 if the cash-flow rights of the largest 
ultimate shareholder are less than 10% (the bank is widely-held). 
Dependent variables: bank risk measures 
We use multiple proxies of bank risk to show whether strong boards have any impact on the bank 
risk-taking. In particular, our four measures of bank risk-taking include Marginal Expected Shortfall 
(MES), Expected Shortfall (ES), the Volatility (VOL) and the Z-score. All these measures are based 
on market data but the Z-score. 
To allow for comparison with previous studies (see Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens, 2012), we 
include the risk measure Volatility (VOL) based on banks market returns over the period 2006-
2010. Following Peni and Vahamaa (2011), bank VOL is calculated as the annualized standard 
deviation of its daily stock returns (Rit) for each fiscal year. The daily stock return is calculated as 
the natural logarithmic of the ratio of equity return series, i.e. Rit = ln (Pit/Pit-1), where the stock 
prices are adjusted for any capital adjustment, including dividend and stock splits. VOL captures the 
overall variability in bank stock returns and reflects the market’s perceptions about the risks 
inherent in the bank’s assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet positions. Both regulators and bank 
managers frequently monitor this total risk measure. 
Another traditional measure of bank risk used in the literature is the Z-score (e.g., Laeven and 
Levine 2009), defined as the distance to default, which equals the average of the return on assets 
(ROA) plus the equity-asset ratio divided by the volatility of ROA. For cross-sectional analysis, the 
equity asset ratio, average and the volatility of ROA are computed for each bank over the entire 
sample period (2006-2010) (Garcia-Kuhnert et al. 2013). It indicates the number of standard 
deviations that ROA would need to fall in order to exhaust equity and force a bank failure. The 
distance to default (DD) is closely linked to the probability of default (PD) so that the higher the 
distance to default, the lower the PD and thus the risk of a bank failure. As Leaven and Levine 
(2009), we take the natural logarithm of the Z-score, which is normally distributed, to smooth the 
effect of extreme values. 
In order to measure a bank exposure to tail risk, we use the Expected Shortfall (ES). ES is coherent 
and more robust than Value at Risk (VaR) as largely investigated by the literature on the topic. 
Moreover, since we investigate the effect of governance structure on risk-taking decisions of banks 
during the crisis, we want to focus on the tails of the distribution whereas VaR only measures the 
distribution quantile and disregards extreme loss beyond the VaR level. This means that it fails to 
take into account the risk referred to as “tail risk”. To alleviate the problems inherent in VaR, 
Artzner et al (1999) propose the use of Expected Shortfall. Starting from the same measure, the 
Expected Shortfall, but computing it for the overall banking system, Acharya et al. (2010) and 
Brownlees et Engle (2010) derive the Marginal Expected Shortfall of a bank as the derivative of the 
market Expected Shortfall with respect to each bank’s weight in the market. The main rationale 
behind the MES with respect to the standard measures of firm-level risk, such as VaR, Beta, 
Expected Loss, or Volatility, is that they have almost no explanatory power, while beta has only a 
modest explanatory power, in detecting systemically risky banks (Acharya et al. 2010).  
Control variables 
Following prior studies, we include in our models a set of control variables in order to account for 
bank characteristics, differences in terms of regulation across countries and pre-crisis 
macroeconomic conditions. A first group of control variables measures differences in bank business 
structure. One of these control variables is bank size (SIZE), which we measure by the natural log 
of total bank assets (Pathan, 2009, Peni and Vahamaa, 2012) at the book value. The variable 
LOANSTA measures differences in banking business model across banks, and it is constructed as 
the ratio of loans to total assets at book value (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). It allows us to 
control for the potential differences between commercial and holding banks. We also add an M&A 
variable to account for mergers and acquisition over the sample period because they might affect 
bank governance (Schranz 1993 and Berger et al. 1998). We trace the bank history on Bankscope 
and identify whether the bank has undergone a major acquisition or merger between 2006 and 2010. 
The M&A variable is a dummy coded 1 if the bank i is involved in an M&A in the analysed year 
and zero otherwise. 
Next to these variables, we include a set of variables that are likely to affect risk-taking decisions.  
In particular, our proxy of bank’s liquidity risk is the liquidity ratio (LIQUID) measured by the ratio 
of liquid assets to customer and short term funding, (LIQUID) that here has to be considered as an 
inverse measure of the liquidity risk. The impaired loans ratio (IMP, impaired loans/gross loans) 
takes into account for the banks credit risk, as it can be considered as a proxy of portfolio quality 
(Casu et al., 2011). We also include Tier 1 as a proxy of bank capitalisation and the leverage (LEV). 
In particular, following Acharya et al. (2010), we compute the variable LEV as the quasi-market 
leverage ratio (quasi-market value of assets divided by market value of equity). 
Together with the MES, the quasi-market leverage is the determinant of a bank systemic risk 
according to Acharya et al. (2009). Differently from the traditional accounting-based measures of 
leverage, it also takes into account market conditions and deleveraging decisions. To account for 
country as source of heterogeneity, we include country dummies in our analyses. We also include 
year dummies to account for time trend over the sample period. The detailed construction of 
variables and their expected sign are presented in Table 1, in which we do not include the country 
and the year dummies. 
         Table 1. Definition of models variables 
Variable Definition Construction Expected sign 
MES 
Marginal Expected 
Shortfall 
 
Dependent variable 
ES Expected Shortfall 
 
Dependent variable 
VOL 
Bank returns 
volatility 
Annualized standard deviation of bank 
daily stock returns 
Dependent variable 
Ln Z-score Distance to default 
ROA plus equity-total assets 
ratio/volatility of ROA 
Dependent variable 
Key independent variables 
BS Board size Number of board of directors H2: Positive 
IND 
Independent 
directors 
Percentage of the independent board 
directors 
H1: Negative 
BM 
Frequency of board 
meetings 
Number of the meeting held during the 
fiscal year 
H3: Negative 
CFR 
Ownership 
concentration 
Cash flow rights of the largest ultimate 
shareholder. CFR equals zero if the bank 
is widely held (10% cut-off) 
H4: Negative 
Control variables 
M&A 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
Dummy coded 1 if the bank is involved 
in a M&A in a year and zero otherwise 
Negative 
SIZE Bank size Ln of Total assets Positive 
LOANSTA 
Bank business 
activity 
Loans/ Total assets Negative 
LEV Quasi-Leverage 
Quasi-market value of assets / Market 
value of equity 
Positive  
IMP Bank credit risk Impaired loans/ Gross loans Positive 
TIER 1 Tier 1 Capital ratio  
Core equity capital / Total risk-weighted 
assets 
Positive 
LIQUID 
Bank liquidity 
position 
Liquid assets/Customer and short term 
funding 
Negative 
 
Notes: This table presents definition, construction, and expected signs on the variables used for the regressions (Model 
1). We do not include year and country dummies.  
However, the country variables do not take into account that there are similarities among the 
countries in legal and regulatory aspect. Therefore, in an extended model we add a set of variables 
related to country-level institutional setting and bank regulation. Following Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012) and Leaven and Levine (2009), we add PRIVATE MONITORING (an index of monitoring 
on the part of the private sector of the banking system), RESTRICT (an index of regulatory 
restriction on bank activities of banks) and CAPITAL (index of regulatory oversight of bank 
capital). We do not include a variable for deposit insurance because the vast majority of the 
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European countries have deposit insurance. We also add the GDP at 2006 to control for pre-crisis 
economic conditions. 
Finally, to control for the possibility that the relation between ownership structure and bank risk 
taking reflects cross-country differences rather than cross-banks differences, we include a country-
level variable defined as LARGESHARHOLDER. We obtain this data from Erkens et al. (2012). It 
is computed, for each country, as the average of a set of dummy variables equal to 1 if a bank in 
that country has a large owner with direct and indirect voting rights greater than 10%, and 0 
otherwise (at December 2006). 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the data used in the regressions.  
< Insert Table 2> 
The board structure variables in Panel A show that the mean BS is 13.45, with a minimum of 4 and 
a maximum of 31 units. The mean of the board meetings is 10.425, with a minimum of 1 and a 
maximum of 36. As to the number of independent directors, in absolute terms, IND varies from 0 to 
20, with a mean of 5.925. CFR is on average quite low, but with a high dispersion and a maximum 
value equal to 73.13. 
For brevity, the descriptive statistics of control variables presented in Panel B are omitted. Turning 
to the descriptive statistics of the bank risk measures, Panel C shows that the annualized bank stock 
return (VOL) has a mean of 44.13% during the sample period. Not surprisingly, Table 2 
demonstrates that the volatility of bank stocks was extremely high during the crisis. The mean MES 
and ES (4.46% and 6.33%) are comparable to the ones reported by Acharya and Steffen (2012), 
considering that we analyse the period 2006-2010, while their research focuses on the period from 
June 2006 to June 2007. Finally, the Z-score mean is line with Laeven and Levine (2009) but with a 
lower volatility. 
Table 3 presents the Pearson’s pair-wise correlation matrix between the independent variables. 
Multicollinearity among the regressors should not be a concern as the maximum value of the 
correlation coefficient is -0.5487, which is between the liquidity ratio (LIQUID) and the bank 
lending activity (LOANSTA).  
< Insert Table 3> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Econometric models 
To examine the effects of corporate governance variables on bank risk during the financial crisis 
and test our four hypotheses, given the literature discussion in section 2, we use panel regressions. 
We estimate alternative versions of the following panel regression specification: 
                                                                      
                                                        
                 
              (1) 
 
where RISK denotes one of the alternative bank risk measures (MES, ES, VOL and Z-score) for 
bank i at time t; the β parameters are the estimated coefficients for the constant and each of the 
independent variables included in the model; IND BS, BM and CFR  are our set of corporate 
governance key independent variables at 2006 as defined in Table 1; GDP at 2006 for each country 
j to control for pre-crisis macroeconomic conditions; Bank_controls is a set of time-varying bank 
specific control variables (M&A, SIZE, LOANSTA, LEV, IMP, TIER 1, LIQUID); Regulation is a 
set of country-level institutional and regulatory variables (CAPITAL, RESTRICT, PRIVATE 
MONITORING, LARGE SHAREHOLDERS); YEAR is a dummy variable for fiscal years 
controlling for the possible change in bank risk over time, and COUNTRY is a dummy variable for 
each country j. Following de Andres and Vallelado (2008), we introduce the board size squared 
(BS_SQ) to account for nonlinear relation. Throughout the panel regressions, we use standard errors 
that are corrected for clustering at the bank-level to allow for correlation of error terms within 
banks. We winsorize all variables at 1%. First, we estimate a parsimonious version of Equation (1) 
that includes all control variables but country-level institutional and regulatory variables (Model 1). 
Model 2 includes the full set of our control variables. 
 
4. Results 
Tables 4-7 present the results of Pooled OLS estimates of Model 1 and Model 2 regressions, when 
considering MES, ES, VOL and Z-score as our dependent variable. As mentioned in the previous 
section, Model 1 is a parsimonious version of Model 2, which excludes country-level institutional 
and regulatory variables.  
< Insert Table 4> 
< Insert Table 5> 
< Insert Table 6> 
< Insert Table 7> 
 
The regression for Model 1 is well-fitted with an overall adjusted R-squared of 50, 62, 61 and 29 
percent for MES, ES, VOL and Z-score respectively, while the regressions for Model 2 have an 
overall adjusted R-squared of 35, 50, 53 and 26 percent for MES, ES, LEV and Z-score, 
respectively. 
As mentioned before, the Z-score is inversely related to the probability of bank insolvency and thus 
it is expected to have an opposite sign with respect to other measures of risk. More importantly, in 
order to interpret our results, we remind that the Z-score differs from the other measures of risk 
used in our analysis because it is based on accounting data at year-end and explicitly accounts for 
bank default. MES, ES and VOL are computed over a one-year horizon but on a daily basis. VOL 
and Z-score are the only two variables we have in common with previous studies. 
With regards to bank board variables, we find that the coefficient on BS is statistically significant 
across all measures of bank risk (with a positive sign for MES, ES, VOL and a negative sign for Z-
score). This illustrates that after controlling for bank characteristics, a small bank board is 
associated with less bank risk-taking during the crisis, both in terms of tail risk, systemic risk, stock 
return volatility, and notably in terms of distance to default. The evidence for the dependent 
variable VOL is in contrast with the results of Pathan (2009) for US-market though for a pre-crisis 
period but in general terms in line with Akhigbe and Martin (2008). The evidence for the Z-score is 
consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012) for a post-crisis period. Overall, this result is consistent 
with our first hypothesis where we argue that a smaller board should have a greater ability to 
coordinate and control the managers and in the decision-making process. The positive relationship 
(negative for the Z-score) we find suggests that banks with larger boards have higher stock market 
volatility, but also that they suffer higher losses during a crisis at an individual level but also in 
terms of contribution to the market losses. This may be because large boards have more difficulties 
to supervise managers and their initiatives in opaque activities and to overcome conflict of interest 
within directors and between directors and managers. Moreover, managers could have an incentive 
to be more linked to the market poor performance, by increasing their systemic risk, to hide their 
true performance during the crisis. Finally, large boards of complex and interconnected bank could 
address shareholders willing to increase exposure to this risk because they believe in a government 
bailout to avoid systemic banking crises.  
Our results show a significant inverted U-shaped relation between board size (BS) and our risk 
measures. This suggests that the addition of new directors is positively related to bank's risk-taking, 
although the increase in risk shows a diminishing marginal growth. Thus, the significant coefficient 
of BS_SQ shows that there is a point at which adding a new director reduces bank risk-taking. 
Following de Andres and Vallelado (2008), we conclude that the benefits deriving from the 
inclusion of more directors in terms of a better monitoring and advising function to the board is 
only effective when the number of directors became larger as to outweigh the cost in terms of 
coordination, control and decision problems. 
Regarding the proportion of independent directors, we find an interesting result. When we add the 
control variables related to the institutional and regulatory setting, we find no support for our 
second hypothesis: board independence is not associated with bank risk, except for Z-score. This 
result is partially in line with Erkens et al. (2012) for VOL. For the Z-score, we find a positive and 
significant coefficient: banks with more independent directors had a lower probability of default 
during the crisis. Overall, this finding is in line with the idea that the role of independent directors is 
valuable during distressed market conditions (as argued by Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) but with 
less effect on daily market perception.  
In addition, we observe that the influence of the independent directors on the other market-based 
measures of bank risk (VOL and ES) weakens in economies with stricter restrictions on bank 
activities but weaker restrictions on bank capital. More in general, we find that the index on 
restrictions of bank activities is positively and significantly related to the bank systemic and tail 
risk-taking during the crisis. This is generally in line with Barth, Caprio, and Levine (1999) 
showing that the banking system is more fragile in countries where banking activities are more 
restricted. In addition, we find that weaker restriction on capital regulation is associated with more 
systemic bank risk (negative and significant coefficient). The interpretation supportive of this result 
is that European banks, in need of capital and liquidity, were involved in off-balance banking 
activities before and after the crisis, exposing them to systemic risks, also for capital arbitrage 
purposes as suggested by Acharya et al. (2013). Moreover, this finding is consistent with Leaven 
and Levine (2009). They argue that stricter capital regulation has an opposite effect in widely held 
bank (less risk) than in banks with concentrated ownership (more risk). They estimate an average 
CFR for an international sample of banks equals to 0.27, while Beltratti and Stulz (2012) estimate 
an average CFR equals 0.23 for the US. Our sample of large European banks has an average of CFR 
equals to 12.2. The coefficient of CFR is negative in all regressions, but weakly significant only for 
the MES. However, our country-level variable for bank ownership, LARGESHAREHOLDERS, is 
positive and significant for all bank risk measures. In other words, the banking system ownership 
structure more than individual bank ownership concentration is associated with more systemic risk.  
We find a negative relation between the number of board meetings (BM) and bank risk-taking. The 
coefficient of BM is negative for all measures of risk and statistically significant, except for Z-
score. This result supports our third hypothesis that a high frequency of bank board meetings means 
that the board plays a more proactive role than reactive, and thus is associated with less tail and 
systemic risk.  
The coefficients on the other bank characteristics all have the expected sign and offer some 
significant insights. For instance, we observe that the LEV is positively associated with all bank risk 
measures. This is consistent with the tendency to consider the leverage, together with MES, as one 
of the main conditions used to identify systemically important risky banks (Acharya and Steffen, 
2012) and as a major concern of the risk management at individual bank-level. Finally, we find 
coherent sign and significant coefficients for our proxy of bank capital (TIER1), credit risk and 
(funding) liquidity risk, IMP and LIQUID. As expected, we find that the bank exposures on these 
two risks were among the main drivers of bank risk during the financial crisis.  
5. Robustness tests and endogeneity issues 
When the unobserved effect is correlated with independent variables, pooled OLS estimations 
produces estimators that are biased and inconsistent (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Our 
secondary estimation method is generalized least square (GLS) random effect (RE) technique 
(Baltagi and Wu, 1999). This technique is robust to first-order autoregressive disturbances (if any) 
within unbalanced-panels and cross-sectional correlation and/or heteroskedasticity across panels. In 
the presence of unobserved bank fixed-effect, panel ‘Fixed-Effect’ (FE) estimation is commonly 
suggested (Wooldridge, 2002). However, such FE estimation is not suitable for our study for 
several reasons. First, time-invariant variable like IND, BS, BM and CFR cannot be estimated with 
FE regression, as it would be absorbed or wiped out in ‘within transformation’ or ‘time-demeaning’ 
process of the variables in FE. Second, for large ‘N’ (i.e. 40) and fixed small ‘T’ (i.e. 5), which is 
the case with this study’s panel data set (40 financial firms over 5 years), FE estimation is 
inconsistent (Baltagi, 2005, p. 13). Furthermore, in case of a large N, FE estimation would lead to 
an enormous loss of degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 2005, p. 14). Thus, an alternative to FE, i.e. GLS 
RE, is proposed here. 
Table 8 presents the results of GLS RE estimates of regression of Equation (1) when either MES, 
ES, VOL and Z-score is the dependent variable. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
< Insert Table 8> 
Referring to the endogeneity concern, we underline that it is a common issue in governance studies 
that makes interpretation of the results difficult. As pointed out by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), 
the relation between board characteristics and firm performance may be spurious because firm's 
governance structure and performance are endogenously determined. In our analysis, risk-taking 
might determine bank governance. Given that there is no empirical method that can eliminate 
endogeneity from the results, we take two steps to minimize the possibility that our results are 
biased. As to the reverse causality, we relate bank corporate governance variables in the earliest 
year of the sample (2006) to bank risk in the subsequent years, as in many governance studies (e.g. 
Erkens et al., 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Chalermchatvichien et al. 2014).  
In addition, the relation may be spurious because our corporate governance variables and the risk-
taking measures are jointly determined by a third unobservable bank characteristic. Following 
Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014), we use the Altonji ratio (Altonji et al., 2005) to estimate the 
potential bias generated by unobservables. In particular, the ratio calculates how large selection on 
unobservables would need to be in order to attribute the entire effect (OLS estimates) to selection 
bias.  
Table 9 presents our estimates of the Altonij ratio for MES. To compute the ratio we run a restricted 
model for each key independent variable where we add only the year dummies. Next, we use the 
coefficient from the restricted model and the full model to compute the ratio. Analytically, it is the 
ratio between the coefficient of the full model and the difference between the coefficients of the 
restricted and the full model. 
< Insert Table 9> 
We ﬁnd that selection on unobservables would need to be 1.6, 2.3, 6.6 and 3 times stronger than 
selection on observables in the case of board independence (IND), board size (BS), number of 
board meetings (BM) and cash flow rights (CFR). For comparison, Altonij et al. (2005) report the 
ratios of 1.43 and 3.55 and argue that with those numbers the endogeneity bias due to possible 
omitted variables is unlikely. Therefore, we can also argue that the endogeneity bias is unlikely in 
our sample. 
6. Conclusions 
Our research on the relationship between corporate governance and tail and systemic risk measures, 
as the Expected Shortfall and the Marginal Expected Shortfall, yields a number of interesting 
findings. We provide empirical evidence on how corporate governance influences the risk taking of 
banks, as shown for a sample of European banks during the crisis. We find that banks with larger 
boards size and lower number of board meetings per year suffered more severe losses than other 
banks, but also that they contributed more to the losses of the banking system as a whole. Overall, 
our results confirm the crucial role of the board of directors in the banking business and its potential 
impact on one of the specialness of it, i.e. the potential to create disruptions able to spread across 
the entire financial system. We suggest that our results could contribute to the current debate on 
corporate governance standards in the banking industry and also banking regulation and 
supervisions when designing tools to prevent bank failure and contagion effects. We believe that 
our focus on the European banking system does not limit the generalization of our results to our 
financial and banking systems because of convergence of corporate governance, regulatory and 
supervisory standards at international level. In fact, we do find evidence of the effect of country-
level characteristics on banks’ systemic risk-taking as the effect of the regulation (on capital and 
bank activities) and of the banking systems’ ownership concentration. Further research could 
explore how recent changes in corporate governance standards and banking regulations may have 
affect this relationship and extend the analysis to an international sample of banks.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: key independent variables 
    BS (No) 200 13.45 5.2522 4 31 
BM (No) 200 10.425 6.2883 1 36 
IND (No) 200 5.925 4.4405 0 20 
CFR (%) 200 9.9714 20.2950 0 73.13 
      Panel B: control variables 
    Bank characteristics 
     M&A 200 0.095 0.2940 0 1 
SIZE (ln) 200 12.0129 1.6886 7.1356 14.7659 
LOANSTA (%) 193 52.7433 18.2000 0.0331 92.2778 
LEV (%) 200 32.318 48.5512 1.7901 435.4532 
IMP (%) 178 3.2998 2.6127 0.19 12.94 
TIER 1 (%) 185 9.1171 2.1361 4.3 14.8 
LIQUID (%) 196 47.0270 47.7212 6.78 441.82 
      
     
 
Macroeconomic variables 
GDP (ln) 200 4.5547 0.1050 4.2802 4.7184  
     Bank regulation 
    CAPITAL 200 5.675 1.9592 2 9 
RESTRICT 200 8.275 2.7178 4 12 
PRIVATE MONITORING 200 6.825 0.8649 4 8 
LARGESHARHOLDER 200 0.7   0.4594 0 1 
      Panel C: dependent variables 
    MES 200 0.0446 0.0282 0.00004 0.1763 
ES   200 0.0633 0.0428 0.0150 0.2680 
VOL  200 0.4413 0.2705 0.1179 1.7177 
Z-score (ln) 200 2.8732 0.8205 -0.4309 4.6261 
      Notes: This table contains the descriptive statistics of the key independent variables, the board variables (IND, BS and 
BM) and ownership (CFR), (Panel A), the control variables (Panel B) and the dependent variables (Panel C);  referring 
to Panel C, we specify that MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 
5
th
 percentile, ES is the expected shortfall of an individual firm below its 5th-percentile; VOL is the annualized daily 
individual stock return volatility and Z-score is computed as the natural logarithm of Z = {[mean (ROA) + 
(Equity/Total assets)] /volatility (ROA)}. Key independent variables, bank regulation variables and macroeconomic 
variables are computed using data at year end 2006. See Table 1 for variables definitions. 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
 
BS BM IND CFR CAPITAL RESTRICT 
PRIVATE 
MONITORING 
LARGE 
SHAREHOLDER 
M&A SIZE LOANSTA LEV TIER 1 IMP LIQUID GDP 
BS 1 
               BM -0.07 1 
              IND 0.46* 0.041 1 
             CFR -0.28* 0.13 -0.04 1 
            CAPITAL 0.02 -0.09 0.03 -0.12 1 
           RESTRICT 0.19 0.27* 0.15 0.23 -0.27* 1 
          PRIVATE 
MONITORING 0.13 0.01 0.24 -0.30* 0.35* -0.18 1 
         LARGE 
SHAREHOLDER -0.28* 0.10 -0.07 0.13 0.23 0.35* -0.28* 1 
        M&A 0.06 0.20 0.23 -0.03 -0.02 0.21 0.02 0.08 1 
       SIZE 0.21 0.10 0.17 -0.23 0.21 -0.33* 0.14 0.04 0.16 1 
      LOANSTA 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.18 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.28* 1 
     LEV 0.04 0.00 -0.19 -0.07 -0.15 -0.12 0.08 -0.28* 0.02 0.23 -0.06 1 
    TIER 1 -0.17 -0.15 -0.13 -0.04 -0.08 -0.20 -0.06 -0.09 -0.21 0.01 -0.34* 0.01 1 
   IMP 0.02 0.14 0.20 0.04 -0.19 0.02 -0.05 -0.22 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.27* 0.21 1 
  LIQUID -0.14 -0.05 -0.15 -0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.21 -0.53* -0.10 0.11 -0.14 1 
 GDP -0.38* 0.08 -0.31* -0.03 -0.52* -0.37* -0.14 -0.34* -0.10 0.11 -0.18 0.23 0.25 -0.01 0.05 1 
Notes: The table shows Pearson pairs-wise correlation matrix for all the independent variables. IND is the proportion of the independent board directors; BS is the number of 
boards of directors; BM is the number of the meetings held by the board during the fiscal year; CRF is a dummy variable which assumes a value equal to 1 if the cash-flow rights 
of the largest ultimate shareholder is greater than 10% and 0 otherwise (cut-offs at 10%); CAPITAL is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital; RESTRICT is an index of 
regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks; PRIVATE MONITORING is an index of monitoring on the part of the private sector; LARGE SHAREHOLDER is the country 
average of a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank has a large owner with direct and indirect voting rights greater than 10%, and 0 otherwise (at December 2006); M&A is a 
dummy variable accounting for merger and acquisitions activities for each bank in each country; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LOANSTA is loans to total assets at 
book value;  LEV is measured as quasi-market value of assets divided by market value of equity, where quasi-market value of assets is book value of assets - book value of equity 
+ market value of equity; IMP is the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans as a proxy of portfolio quality; TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets; LIQUID is 
measured by the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short term funding; GDP is the natural logarithm of real domestic product per capita for 2006. * significant at 5%. 
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Table 4. Model 1 and Model 2: OLS estimates of MES 
 OLS regressions  - 
Dependent variable MES 
MODEL  1 MODEL  2 
Coefficients 
Sig (p-
value) 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
    
Coefficients 
Sig (p-
value) 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
Key independent variables 
      
   IND -0.0334 0.671 0.0781 -0.0926 0.239 0.0773 
BS 0.3826* 0.095 0.2233 0.3881** 0.026 0.1668 
BS_SQ -0.3676* 0.076 0.2014 -0.2411* 0.098 0.1586 
BM -0.1487*** 0.007 0.0521 -0.1522*** 0.002 0.0459 
CFR -0.0158 0.823 0.0699 -0.0058* 0.068 0.0031 
 
   
  
 Control variables 
  
    M&A -0.0068 0.955 0.1191 -0.0792 0.497 0.1154 
SIZE 0.1806** 0.040 0.0847 0.0688 0.474 0.0951 
LOANSTA -0.1514 0.197 0.1150 -0.2288 0.214 0.1809 
LEV 0.2549*** 0.002 0.0780 0.4205*** 0.000 0.0722 
IMP 0.1503** 0.036 0.0688 0.1887 0.119 0.1180 
TIER 1 -0.0074 0.923 0.0768 0.2047** 0.036 0.0938 
LIQUID -0.3147** 0.018 0.1266 -0.4317** 0.024 0.1828 
GDP 0.1179* 0.060 0.0607 0.2334* 0.065 0.1227 
CAPITAL 
   
-0.4287** 0.021 0.1775 
RESTRICT 
   
0.3055** 0.015 0.1192 
PRIVATE MONITORING 
   
-0.1668* 0.066 0.0879 
LARGE SHAREHOLDER 
   
0.4546** 0.027 0.1971 
  
 
  
 
 COUNTRY DUMMIES 
 
Included 
  
Included 
 YEAR DUMMIES 
 
Included 
  
Included 
 
  
 
    
CONS -0.6315*** 0.000 0.0825 -2.1707*** 0.000 0.1984 
Adj - R
2 
0.4035  
  0.3531     
Number of obs.         178 
  
178     
  Dependent variable - Model 1 and Model 2: MES  
 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of Model 1 and Model 2 with the standard error adjusted for clustering at the 
bank-level. MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5
th
 percentile.   
Model 1 is the parsimonious model, in which the explanatory variables are IND, BS, BS_SQ, BM, CFR, M&A, SIZE, 
LOANSTA, LEV, IMP, TIER 1, LIQUID e GDP. IND is the proportion of the independent board directors; BS is the 
number of boards of directors; BM is the number of the meetings held by the board during the fiscal year; CRF is a 
dummy variable which assumes a value equal to 1 if the cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder is greater 
than 10% and 0 otherwise (cut-offs at 10%); M&A is a dummy variable accounting for merger and acquisitions 
activities for each bank in each country; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LOANSTA is loans to total assets 
at book value;  LEV is measured as quasi-market value of assets divided by market value of equity, where quasi-market 
value of assets is book value of assets - book value of equity + market value of equity; IMP is the ratio of impaired 
loans to gross loans as a proxy of portfolio quality; TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets; LIQUID 
is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short term funding; GDP is the natural logarithm of real 
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domestic product per capita for 2006. Model 2 is the full model, in which the explanatory variables are: IND, BS, 
BS_SQ, BM, CFR, M&A, SIZE, LOANSTA, LEV, IMP, TIER 1, LIQUID, GDP, CAPITAL, RESTRICT, PRIVATE 
MONITORING AND LARGE SHAREHOLDER. CAPITAL is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital; 
RESTRICT is an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks; PRIVATE MONITORING is an index of 
monitoring on the part of the private sector; LARGE SHAREHOLDER is the country average of a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a bank has a large owner with direct and indirect voting rights greater than 10%, and 0 otherwise (at 
December 2006); all regressions include year and country dummies; all variables, except for the dummies, are 
winsorized at 1%. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
Table 5 . Model 1 and Model 2: OLS estimates of ES 
 OLS regressions  - 
Dependent variable ES 
MODEL  1 MODEL  2 
Coefficients 
Sig (p-
value) 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
    
Coefficients 
Sig (p-
value) 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
Key independent variables 
      
   IND -0.1120* 0.057 0.5689 -0.0732 0.232 0.0602 
BS 0.4731** 0.016 0.1871 0.4065** 0.047 0.1979 
BS_SQ -0.3570** 0.025 0.1528 -0.2147* 0.098  0.1587 
BM -0.1164** 0.015 0.0453 -0.1413*** 0.004 0.0453 
CFR 0.0273 0.660 0.0616 -0.0408 0.513 0.0618 
 
   
  
 Control variables 
  
    M&A -0.1498 0.242 0.1259 -0.1320 0.177 0.0958 
SIZE -0.0074 0.933 0.0875 -0.0530 0.51 0.0797 
LOANSTA -0.0944 0.471 0.1295 0.0217 0.854 0.1167 
LEV 0.4025*** 0.000 0.0802 0.5607*** 0.000 0.0709 
IMP 0.2521*** 0.000 0.0603 0.2751** 0.013 0.1052 
TIER 1 0.0407 0.615 0.0802 0.2154** 0.021 0.0888 
LIQUID -0.2963** 0.046 0.1432 -0.3090** 0.033 0.1389 
GDP 0.1320*** 0.007 0.0462 0.2318* 0.066 0.1220 
CAPITAL 
   
-0.3051* 0.053 0.1522 
RESTRICT 
   
0.2132 0.371 0.2353 
PRIVATE MONITORING 
   
-0.1042 0.177 0.0757 
LARGE SHAREHOLDER 
   
0.3064*** 0.002 0.0896 
  
 
  
 
 COUNTRY DUMMIES 
 
Included 
  
Included 
 YEAR DUMMIES 
 
Included 
  
Included 
 
  
 
    
CONS -0.4389*** 0.000 0.0700 -1.7238*** 0.000 0.1618 
Adj - R
2 
0.6162   0.5051 
    
Number of obs. 178 
  
178     
 Dependent variable - Model 1 and Model 2: ES  
 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of Model 1 and Model 2 with the standard error adjusted for clustering at the 
bank-level. ES is the expected shortfall of an individual firm below its 5th-percentile. Model 1 is the parsimonious 
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model, in which the explanatory variables are IND, BS, BS_SQ, BM, CFR, M&A, SIZE, LOANSTA, LEV, IMP, TIER 
1, LIQUID e GDP. IND is the proportion of the independent board directors; BS is the number of boards of directors; 
BM is the number of the meetings held by the board during the fiscal year; CRF is a dummy variable which assumes a 
value equal to 1 if the cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder is greater than 10% and 0 otherwise (cut-offs 
at 10%); M&A is a dummy variable accounting for merger and acquisitions activities for each bank in each country; 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LOANSTA is loans to total assets at book value;  LEV is measured as 
quasi-market value of assets divided by market value of equity, where quasi-market value of assets is book value of 
assets - book value of equity + market value of equity; IMP is the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans as a proxy of 
portfolio quality; TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets; LIQUID is measured by the ratio of liquid 
assets to customer and short term funding; GDP is the natural logarithm of real domestic product per capita for 2006. 
Model 2 is the full model, in which the explanatory variables are: IND, BS, BS_SQ, BM, CFR, M&A, SIZE, 
LOANSTA, LEV, IMP, TIER 1, LIQUID, GDP, CAPITAL, RESTRICT, PRIVATE MONITORING AND LARGE 
SHAREHOLDER. CAPITAL is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital; RESTRICT is an index of regulatory 
restrictions on the activities of banks; PRIVATE MONITORING is an index of monitoring on the part of the private 
sector; LARGE SHAREHOLDER is the country average of a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank has a large owner 
with direct and indirect voting rights greater than 10%, and 0 otherwise (at December 2006); all regressions include 
year and country dummies; all variables, except for the dummies, are winsorized at 1%. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1% 
Table 6 . Model 1 and Model 2: OLS estimates of VOL 
 OLS regressions  - 
Dependent variable VOL 
MODEL  1 MODEL  2 
Coefficients 
Sig (p-
value) 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
    
Coefficients 
Sig (p-
value) 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
Key independent variables 
      
   IND -0.1285** 0.026 0.0553 -0.0614 0.271 0.0548 
BS 0.5014** 0.013 0.1911 0.3267** 0.022 0.1362 
BS_SQ -0.3974** 0.014 0.1537 -0.2549** 0.056 0.1291 
BM -0.1160** 0.014 0.0450 -0.1516*** 0.000 0.0376 
CFR - 0.0332 0.587 0.0607 -0.0204 0.684 0.0497 
 
   
  
 Control variables 
  
    M&A -0.1448 0.226 0.1174 -0.1279 0.186 0.0949 
SIZE -0.0082 0.928 0.0900 -0.0543 0.423 0.0670 
LOANSTA -0.1561 0.261 0.1368 -0.1405 0.244 0.1186 
LEV 0.4032*** 0.000 0.0832 0.5275*** 0.000 0.0681 
IMP 0.2477*** 0.000 0.0525 0.3404*** 0.000 0.0873 
TIER 1 0.0503 0.534 0.0802 0.2598*** 0.006 0.0896 
LIQUID -0.3930** 0.026 0.1688 -0.3090** 0.035 0.1405 
GDP 0.1095** 0.034 0.0496 0.5611*** 0.000 0.0999 
CAPITAL 
   
-0.7536*** 0.000 0.1784 
RESTRICT 
   
1.4680*** 0.000 0.3225 
PRIVATE MONITORING 
   
0.0733 0.225 0.0594 
LARGE SHAREHOLDER 
   
0.6633*** 0.000 0.0966 
  
 
  
 
 COUNTRY DUMMIES 
 
Included 
  
Included 
 YEAR DUMMIES 
 
Included 
  
Included 
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CONS -0.4599*** 0.000 0.0792 -1.3983*** 0.000 0.1540 
Adj - R
2 
0.6132   0.5395   
Number of obs. 178 
  
178     
Dependent variable - Model 1 and Model 2: VOL 
 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of Model 1 and Model 2 with the standard error adjusted for clustering at the 
bank-level. VOL is the annualized daily individual stock return volatility. Model 1 is the parsimonious model, in which 
the explanatory variables are IND, BS, BS_SQ, BM, CFR, M&A, SIZE, LOANSTA, LEV, IMP, TIER 1, LIQUID e 
GDP. IND is the proportion of the independent board directors; BS is the number of boards of directors; BM is the 
number of the meetings held by the board during the fiscal year; CRF is a dummy variable which assumes a value equal 
to 1 if the cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder is greater than 10% and 0 otherwise (cut-offs at 10%); 
M&A is a dummy variable accounting for merger and acquisitions activities for each bank in each country; SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets; LOANSTA is loans to total assets at book value;  LEV is measured as quasi-market 
value of assets divided by market value of equity, where quasi-market value of assets is book value of assets - book 
value of equity + market value of equity; IMP is the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans as a proxy of portfolio 
quality; TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets; LIQUID is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to 
customer and short term funding; GDP is the natural logarithm of real domestic product per capita for 2006. Model 2 is 
the full model, in which the explanatory variables are: IND, BS, BS_SQ, BM, CFR, M&A, SIZE, LOANSTA, LEV, 
IMP, TIER 1, LIQUID, GDP, CAPITAL, RESTRICT, PRIVATE MONITORING AND LARGE SHAREHOLDER. 
CAPITAL is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital; RESTRICT is an index of regulatory restrictions on the 
activities of banks; PRIVATE MONITORING is an index of monitoring on the part of the private sector; LARGE 
SHAREHOLDER is the country average of a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank has a large owner with direct and 
indirect voting rights greater than 10%, and 0 otherwise (at December 2006); all regressions include year and country 
dummies; all variables, except for the dummies, are winsorized at 1%. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
Table 7. Model 1 and Model 2: OLS estimates of Z-score. 
 OLS regressions  - 
Dependent variable Z-
score 
MODEL  1 MODEL  2 
Coefficients 
Sig (p-
value) 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
    
Coefficients 
Sig (p-
value) 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
Key independent variables 
      
   IND 0.3737*** 0.004 0.1208 0.3434* 0.068 0.1826 
BS -0.8943*** 0.007 0.3140 -0.9462*** 0.002 0.2893 
BS_SQ 0.09251*** 0.002 0.2701 0.9086*** 0.001 0.2584 
BM 0.1070 0.241 0.0898 -0.0877 0.148 0.0594 
CFR 0.0678 0.533 0.1077 0.1646 0.260 0.1439 
 
   
  
 Control variables 
  
    M&A -0.0530 0.770 0.1804 -0.0525 0.747 0.1617 
SIZE -0.0189 0.911 0.1676 0.1655 0.532 0.2619 
LOANSTA -0.1470 0.661 0.3327 -0.1873 0.604 0.3576 
LEV -0.4019*** 0.001 0.1052 -0.2121** 0.038 0.0981 
IMP -0.1369 0.260 0.1197 0.0790 0.558 0.1335 
TIER 1 0.0165 0.880 0.1083 0.0482 0.631 0.0995 
LIQUID 0.0084 0.985 0.4546 -0.2440 0.585 0.4430 
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GDP -0.1624* 0.100 0.1309 -0.0055* 0.096 0.2421 
CAPITAL 
   
-0.1657 0.746 0.5074 
RESTRICT 
   
1.0673 0.194 0.8056 
PRIVATE MONITORING 
   
-0.0280 0.864 0.1627 
LARGE SHAREHOLDER 
   
0.2913 0.180 0.2131 
  
 
  
 
 COUNTRY DUMMIES 
 
Included 
  
Included 
 YEAR DUMMIES 
 
Included 
  
Included 
 
  
 
    
CONS -0.2610* 0.094 0.1518 -0.5822* 0.100 0.3510 
Adj - R
2  
0.2871   0.2613   
Number of obs. 178 
  
178     
Dependent variable - Model 1 and Model 2: Z-score 
 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of Model 1 and Model 2 with the standard error adjusted for clustering at the 
bank-level. Z-score is computed as the natural logarithm of Z = {[mean (ROA) + (Equity/Total assets)] /volatility 
(ROA)}. Model 1 is the parsimonious model, in which the explanatory variables are IND, BS, BS_SQ, BM, CFR, 
M&A, SIZE, LOANSTA, LEV, IMP, TIER 1, LIQUID e GDP. IND is the proportion of the independent board 
directors; BS is the number of boards of directors; BM is the number of the meetings held by the board during the fiscal 
year; CRF is a dummy variable which assumes a value equal to 1 if the cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate 
shareholder is greater than 10% and 0 otherwise (cut-offs at 10%); M&A is a dummy variable accounting for merger 
and acquisitions activities for each bank in each country; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LOANSTA is 
loans to total assets at book value;  LEV is measured as quasi-market value of assets divided by market value of equity, 
where quasi-market value of assets is book value of assets - book value of equity + market value of equity; IMP is the 
ratio of impaired loans to gross loans as a proxy of portfolio quality; TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-
weighted assets; LIQUID is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short term funding; GDP is the 
natural logarithm of real domestic product per capita for 2006. Model 2 is the full model, in which the explanatory 
variables are: IND, BS, BS_SQ, BM, CFR, M&A, SIZE, LOANSTA, LEV, IMP, TIER 1, LIQUID, GDP, CAPITAL, 
RESTRICT, PRIVATE MONITORING AND LARGE SHAREHOLDER. CAPITAL is an index of regulatory 
oversight of bank capital; RESTRICT is an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks; PRIVATE 
MONITORING is an index of monitoring on the part of the private sector; LARGE SHAREHOLDER is the country 
average of a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank has a large owner with direct and indirect voting rights greater than 
10%, and 0 otherwise (at December 2006); all regressions include year and country dummies; all variables, except for 
the dummies, are winsorized at 1%. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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      Table 8. Random effects (RE) - GLS estimates of  MES, ES, VOL and Z-score  
Measures of risk MES ES VOL Z-score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Key independent variables         
IND -0.0930 -0.0506 -0.0617 0.9134** 
BS 0.4118** 0.3632** 0.3295* -0.4138*  
BS_SQ -0.2530* -0.2395* -0.2562* 0.6182* 
BM -0.1539** -0.1394*** -0.1518*** -0.0181 
CFR -0.1206* -0.0445 -0.0203 0.0122 
 
    
Control variables     
Bank characteristics     
M&A -0.0850 -0.1237 -0.1286 0.0060 
SIZE 0.0758 -0.0575 -0.0549 -0.1384 
LOANSTA -0.2018 -0.0298 -0.1398 0.2984*** 
LEV 0.4242*** 0.5620*** 0.5273*** -0.0498*** 
IMP 0.1866 0.2950** 0.3421*** 0.0705*** 
TIER1 0.2089* 0.2269*** 0.2603*** 0.0645*** 
LIQUID -0.4714** -0.2724 -0.3137* 0.0427 
 
    
Macroeconomic variables     
GDP 0.2581* 0.2878** 0.2608** -0.1172*** 
 
    
Other control variables Included Included Included Included 
 
    
COUNTRY DUMMIES Included  Included Included Included 
YEAR DUMMIES Included Included Included Included 
 
CONSTANT 
 
-2.1990*** -1.3984*** -1.3311*** -1.0259** 
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R- Square (overall) 0.6854 0.6935 0.7142 0.6422 
Wald χ2 test 347.09 429.35 453.26 279.23 
Number of Obs. 178 178 178 178 
 
Notes: The table reports RE-GLS estimates of Model 2 with the standard error adjusted for clustering at the bank-level. 
The dependent variables are MES, ES, VOL and Z-score. MES (Column 1) is the marginal expected shortfall of a stock 
given that the market return is below its 5
th
 percentile; ES (Column 2) is the expected shortfall of an individual bank 
below its 5th-percentile; VOL (Column 3) is the annualized daily individual stock return volatility; Z-score (Column 4) 
is computed as the natural logarithm of  Z = {[mean (ROA) + (Equity/Total assets)] /volatility (ROA)}. Among 
independent variables, IND is the proportion of the independent board directors; BS is the number of boards of 
directors; BM is the number of the meetings held by the board during the fiscal year. As to control variables, the M&A 
variable is a dummy variable accounts for merger and acquisitions activities for each bank in each country. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets; LOANSTA is loans to total assets at book value;  LEV is measured as quasi-market 
value of assets divided by market value of equity, where quasi-market value of assets is book value of assets - book 
value of equity + market value of equity; IMP is the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans as a proxy of portfolio 
quality; TIER1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets and LIQUID is measured by the ratio of liquid assets 
to customer and short term funding. GDP is the natural logarithm of real domestic product per capita for 2006 (as in 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012)). The bank regulation variables are from Caprio,  Laeven, and Levine (2007) using data in the 
2007 database (revised in June 2008) downloaded from the World Bank. CAPITAL  is an index of regulatory oversight 
of bank capital; RESTRICT is an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks and PRIVATE 
MONITORING is an index of monitoring on the part of the private sector. The  LARGE SHAREHOLDER variable is 
from Erkens et al. (2012) and it is the country average of a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank has a large owner with 
direct and indirect voting rights greater than 10%, and 0 otherwise (at December 2006). All regressions include year and 
country dummies. All variables, except for the dummies, are winsorized at 1%. 
 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1% 
     
  Table 9. Altonji ratio for MES 
 
RM1 RM2 RM3 RM4 FM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Key independent variables          
IND -0.0347 
   
-0.0926 
BS 
 
0.5537** 
  
0.3881 
BS_SQ 
 
-0.5678*** 
  
-0.2411 
BM 
  
-0.1292** 
 
-0.1522 
CFR    
-0.0039* -0.0058 
 
    
 
Control variables     
 
Bank characteristics     
 
M&A     -0.0792 
SIZE     0.0688 
LOANSTA     -0.2288 
LEV     0.4205*** 
IMP     0.1887 
TIER1     0.2047** 
LIQUID     -0.4317** 
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Other Control variables 
    
Included 
 
    
 
COUNTRY DUMMIES     
Included 
YEAR DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included 
 
CONSTANT 
 
 -0.8189*** -0.8189*** -0.8189*** -0.8189*** 
 
-2.1707*** 
Adj - R
2 0.3745 0.3842 0.3923 0.3802            0.3531 
Altonji ratio -1.60014 2.34356 (BS) -6.61452 -3.0333  
Number of obs. 178 178 178 178 178 
 Notes: The table reports the estimates of Altonji ratio for MES. RM1 is the restricted model for IND variable, RM2 is 
the restricted model for BS variable, RM3 is the restricted model for BM variable, RM4 is the  restricted model for CFR 
variable and FM is the full model (Model 2 - Table 4). Following Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014), we estimate the 
Altonji ratio as βF- (βR - βF), where βF and βF are respectively the coefficients of the restricted and of the full models. 
IND is the proportion of the independent board directors; BS is the number of boards of directors; BM is the number of 
the meetings held by the board during the fiscal year; CRF is a dummy variable which assumes a value equal to 1 if the 
cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder are greater than 10% and 0 otherwise (cut-offs at 10%). 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
